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Abstract 
This paper empirically analyses the effect of direct airline routes on plant-level investment and 
productivity in Norway. I look at the effects of changes in proximity due to the opening of 
new direct flight routes between the locations of headquarters and plants. Improvement in 
proximity leads to lower monitoring costs for the headquarter, and may lower potential agency 
costs. This is a thoroughly studied topic on arms-length transactions, but little is known on 
intra-firm proximity.  
Looking at Norwegian flight information from 2004 to 2014, and financial information on 
Norwegian headquarters and plants from 2002 to 2012, I find ten new flights opening between 
ten areas in Norway. This constitutes ten treated destinations with 375 firms having 
headquarter and plant located at either end of a route. As a control group, I find 667 companies 
with headquarter and plant located in different parts of Norway, that does not yet have a direct 
route connecting them. 
My main analysis is on the difference in plants’ return on assets, but I also look at the 
EBITDA-margin, operating margin, absolute investment from headquarters to plants, and the 
profitability deriving from that investment. 
I find through several regional and year-specific analyses that there is strong evidence of 
increased profitability from proximity. I find that investment from headquarter decreases with 
proximity, leading to less but better investment overall. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Basis for Analysis 
This paper originates from the study “Proximity and investment: evidence from plant-level 
data” by Xavier Giroud (2012). Giroud analyzes the effect of proximity on plants in the United 
States. I wish to do a similar analysis on the air traffic and firms in Norway.  
1.2 Background 
The theory of the firm and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are the first steps of the 
theoretical background for my analysis. Agency theory and the idea that monitoring reduce 
agency costs are widely agreed upon. The economic effect of increased monitoring due to 
reduced monitoring costs is what I am interested in.  
There are multiple studies on the effect of the geographical location of subsidiaries in relation 
to headquarter, in particular on multinational corporations. Lerner (1995) finds that venture 
capitalists, who monitor their investments closely, are more represented on board of directors 
of companies that are more closely located. This is to be expected as monitoring is less costly. 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that mutual fund managers strongly prefer to invest in local 
firms where monitoring gives them abnormal returns. It is the combination of home bias and 
increased monitoring I wish to analyze in Norway.  
In his study, Giroud (2012) finds that the improvement in proximity between headquarters and 
plats in manufacturing industries in the United States is closely related to plant-level 
performance. He looks at the investment and productivity of the plants. The relevant factor he 
looked at was improvement in domestic flight routes within the United States. The strength of 
this analysis is that it looks at travel time as the independent variable in monitoring costs, not 
the geographical location in itself. Wibeche Hansen (2014) did a similar analysis on new 
tunnels and bridges as the improvement in proximity in Norway. I take inspiration from both 
papers to analyze the effects of new direct flight routes in Norway on plant-level performance. 
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1.3 About Air Traffic in Norway 
Norway is a long-range, mountainous country. It has many fjords and rivers, making roads 
expensive and complicated to build.  It is widely known that Norway has a poor road standard. 
Because of this, air traffic is vital for long-distance transportation. On distances greater than 
300km, 47% of the travelers chose to travel by air (Liam and Fuglom, 2015). This percentage 
increases with distance. 
Domestic flights in Norway consist of a much larger portion of flights than in other European 
countries. Out of all air traffic in Norway, 29% is domestic flights (Halpern, 2013), whereas 
Eurostat reports an average of 18% domestic flights in Europe.  
Travel habits are vital for my analysis. When identifying a new route I can be reasonably 
certain that this constitutes a realistic improvement for management. 
The Norwegian aviation industry has gone through several changes during the last decades. 
Originally there were two main airline actors, SAS and Braathens. The two merged in 2002, 
and in addition a new airline, Norwegian Air Shuttle emerged as a low cost carrier in 2002. 
When starting my research I thought this development and the resulting routes would be an 
interesting starting point. For reasons stated later however, these structural changes fall outside 
my treatment window. Therefore, which airline operates which route is immaterial to my 
analysis, I look only at new routes and the number of flights in a given year. 
1.4 Focus and Research Questions 
I wish to analyze the effect of proximity on headquarters and plants in Norway. I look at the 
opening of a direct route between two areas previously travelled only by two or more flights, 
as an improvement in proximity. This makes it easier for management to travel to and from 
plants. I use reduction in travel time, or more precisely, the reduction in time having to be 
spent for the purpose of visiting the plant, as the exogenous variable affecting the cost of 
monitoring plants. I treat a reduction in cost of monitoring as increased ability to monitor, 
thereby possibly reducing agency costs.  
The causal relationship between financial performance, investment and proximity is what I 
am interested in. To measure financial performance, I look at the return on assets, EBITDA-
margin and operating margin of plants. I compare the performance of treated firms with the 
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performance of control firms, to see the effect of increased monitoring. A treated firm is one 
where a direct route has opened between plant and headquarter in the relevant time window.  
Changes in investment from treatment is something I wish to analyze as well. Here I look at 
both the absolute level of investment of headquarters to plants, and the relative profitability 
derived from that investment. 
I raise the following research question and sub-questions: 
 
1: What is the economic effect of proximity on plant-level performance and investment in 
Norway? 
 
Sub-questions: 
2a: Are changes in performance more prominent in certain industries or areas? 
2b: Does proximity lead to more, or better investments in plants? 
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2.  Theoretical Background 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Agency Costs 
One of the most thoroughly researched topics in economics is Corporate Governance and 
Agency Costs. Berk and DeMarzo (2014) defines corporate governance as conflicts of interest 
and the attempts to minimize them. When a firm has a plant or subsidiary, the headquarter 
owns the plant, but the plant must have some freedom to make decisions.   
The separation of ownership and control in a corporation leads to conflict of interests, agency 
costs. The principal-agent relationship is when one party (the principal) engages another party 
(the agent) to act in some way on the principal’s behalf (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of:  
i) The monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
ii) The bonding expenditures by the agent 
iii) The residual loss. 
The principal is the owner or headquarter, and the agent is the plant or subsidiary. The 
monitoring expenditures are the cost the principal incurs from looking over the agents shoulder 
or giving instructions. The monitoring costs by the principal are the main focus in this paper. 
Bonding costs are costs that a principal will pay an agent to avoid an undesirable action. In 
addition to those costs there will be some divergence from the actions taken and the optimal 
outcome for the principal. This cost is the residual loss. 
Even though delegating decision making is costly, it can be in perfect accordance with optimal 
decision making (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
2.1.1 Profit Maximization – Why there are Agency Costs 
Agency costs are market imperfection (Benz and DeMarzo, 2014). They stem from a conflict 
of interests between principal and agent. The conflict is that every actor is maximizing its own 
utility. The plant manager may get prestige or get paid in accordance with the size of his plant, 
and therefore takes actions that benefit the plant more than the company as a whole. He is 
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risking the headquarter’s money and the potential upside is greater than the potential 
downside. Therefore, one can assume he would not act completely as he would if he was 
maximizing the whole firm’s utility, or acting out the goals of the principal. 
How closely aligned the interests of the agent and principal are indicates the seriousness of 
the agency problem (Benz and DeMarzo, 2014). 
2.2 Managing Subsidiaries 
Increased information about agent behavior through monitoring reduces the risk of undesirable 
behavior (Holmstrøm, 1979). Monitoring can be defined as the action of acquiring information 
about the behavior and decisions of subsidiary management (O’Donnell, 2002). The most 
direct form of monitoring is personal supervision. Proximity makes obtaining this information 
through direct supervision cheaper and easier.  
Building on resource dependence theory and self-determination theory, Ambos et. al. (2010) 
argues that the two basic goals of subsidiary managers are to achieve autonomy vis-à-vis 
corporate headquarters and influence over other units. When analyzing subsidiary’s initiative, 
they conclude that subsidiaries are only able to increase their influence through initiatives that 
get the headquarter’s attention. Furthermore, initiatives drawing the headquarters’ attention, 
again decrease the subsidiary’s autonomy. 
This is a clear conflict of interest. The subsidiary manager wants autonomy to invest as he 
wishes, while the headquarter wants the cheapest and easiest method of controlling the agent 
to follow its goals and strategies. 
2.3 Home Bias – Evidence from Venture Capitalists and 
Mutual Funds 
The presence of home bias in investment decisions is well documented and agreed upon. Home 
bias is investors’ tendency to prefer home markets and domestic investments despite 
advantages of diversification and increased market integration worldwide (Wang et. a, 2010). 
Whether home bias is based on superior inside knowledge gained from proximity, or just an 
irrational overestimation of the advantage, is widely debated. 
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2.3.1 Investment Habits 
In a study of Swedish investment habits Massa and Simonov (2006) look at hedging in 
portfolio choice. They treat hedging as diversification, as opposed to a home biased strategy. 
With factors including demographic and financial information on investor level, they show 
that investors prefer stocks located nearby. They find proof that their home bias is not a failure 
to hedge, but that the geographic proximity offers familiarity and a lower cost of acquiring 
information. 
2.3.2 Mutual Funds 
When analyzing the null hypothesis that no home bias persisted in mutual fund managers in 
the United States (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), the hypothesis is rejected. They uncover not 
only persistent domestic home bias to the United States, but also to the local market and home 
town of the mutual fund managers. They find location and physical distance between the 
investment and mutual fund investor to be a key element in the portfolio choice. 
2.3.3 Venture Capitalists 
The venture capital (VC) industry is dominated by limited partnerships (Berk and DeMarzo, 
2014). VC firms specialize in investing in young firms. It is a high-stakes investment with 
potentially high returns and a high volatility (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). In addition to 
financing, they offer industry knowledge and expertise to young firms. Most often they chose 
to actively participate in the running of the firm they invest in. A direct way of monitoring the 
firms available to venture capitalists, is through the board of directors.  
Sitting on the board of directors is used as a proxy for monitoring the firms in Lerner’s (1995) 
study on venture capitalists. He looks at which private firms the VC chose to sit on the board 
of directors of, in relation to geographical proximity. He finds a strong relation between 
geographical proximity and membership on the board of directors. This is to be expected if 
the cost of monitoring closer investments is cheaper. Lerner (1995) also finds a strong 
correlation between the level of monitoring and times when the VC feels monitoring is most 
vital, when the chief executive officer is replaced. This article does not include information 
on whether the monitoring led to higher returns or increased productivity, it only reveals the 
presence of home bias in choosing which firms to monitor. 
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2.4 Intra-Firm Analysis 
The presence of home bias in arms-length transactions has been thoroughly documented. Intra-
firm analysis on the topic is less common. Giroud’s (2012) study on the effect of proximity to 
headquarter on plant level management in the United States gives insight in home bias and the 
effect of management. He finds that investment in plants increases as proximity improves. 
Whether increased investment is due to a better insight into a plant’s needs, or just investment 
in more familiar plants (home bias), is important. One can look at the financial performance 
of the plant to gauge the effect of increased monitoring (Giroud, 2012).  
There is also the possibility of over-monitoring. If you invested heavily into monitoring a 
plant, you might feel the need to justify that investment by making changes. If that plant is 
already acting optimally, you would achieve a sub-optimal solution due to too much 
monitoring. If you take funds from one plant and invest them into the wrong plant solely due 
to monitoring, you also destroy value. Too much guidance from headquarter can also impair 
plant managers incentive to come up with new ideas and investment opportunities. 
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3.  Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Construction of Dataset 
3.1.1 Plant-Level Data 
From the Norwegian Corporate Accounts I am provided with a database on the plant level 
data. This database includes both descriptive and financial information on all companies in 
Norway from 1992 to 2012. This database is extensive, and is my main source of information 
on the companies I wish to analyze. In the financial database I look at net income, total assets, 
investment in subsidiaries, EBITDA margin, and operating margin for each year. In the 
descriptive database I extract information on both organization number, headquarter 
organization number, postal code and industry codes on each firm.  
3.1.1.1 Descriptive Information 
In the descriptive dataset the information is sorted on a company level, not group level. I need 
to connect each plant with its respective headquarter. I do this by connecting the headquarter 
information to the headquarter organization number listed on a plant observation.  
I wish to analyze the impact of proximity on plant level data. I therefore connect all relevant 
information on headquarters to the relevant plant in the relevant year. I assume a company 
with a listed headquarter organization number is a subsidiary (plant), and those without are 
either single-unit firms or headquarters themselves. I do not take into account several layers 
within a group. A company can be both headquarter and plant at the same time. As I only look 
at company level, I do not consider this a major weakness. I look at the economic effect of 
headquarter monitoring on a plant, and whether that plant has a plant to monitor or not does 
not influence the first effect. It could however give a false significant result if a high number 
of the firms are within the same group and results may therefore be correlated within the group.  
I do not think this is a significant part of my dataset, or a major weakness. 
The postal code is one of the most important pieces of information I need on both headquarter 
and plant. Different postal codes means that plant and headquarter is located in different parts 
of Norway, and I use this as a basis for calculating travel time. 
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3.1.1.2 Financial Information 
I wish to analyze the economic impact of proximity on plants. I use total assets and net income 
to calculate plant level profitability. I also look at the EBITDA margin and operating margin 
to get a broader basis for analyzing trends and conclusions. In the company balance sheet I 
find investment in subsidiaries. Here I connect the headquarter figures to the plant and analyze 
it as “investment from headquarter”.  
3.1.1.3 Plant-Level Treatment Window 
An issue with the Norwegian Corporate Accounts database is missing values. There are no 
registration of postal codes prior to 1997. Headquarter organization numbers are missing 
before 2003. As these values are both vital to my analysis, this leaves me with a 10 year 
treatment window from 2003-2012. 
3.1.2 Flight Route Information 
3.1.2.1 Relevant Treatment Window 
From Avinor I received a dataset with information on all domestic and international flights 
taking off from Norwegian airports from 2004 to 2014. I wish to identify routes that have been 
treated in the relevant sample period. My treatment window from plant-level data is from 
2003-2012. As the oldest information on a flight I have access to is 2004, I look at flights that 
was introduced later than 2004. I wish to have at least one year of data prior to and after a 
treatment. This leaves me with a treatment window from 2005 to 2011.  
3.1.2.2 Restrictions on Treated Routes 
The information I am interested in is the number of flights between two destinations in Norway 
in a given year. In the first year of the opening of a new route, there are often significantly 
fewer flights than the years following. For a route to be considered as treated and accessible 
to a company, I require there be at least on average one flight per week in a given year. This 
eliminates the problem of sample years where a flight opens in the middle of a year; I only 
consider a route as treated the year it has 52 flights or more.  
I eliminate a route if it has closed during the relevant time window, as this could influence my 
results. I also exclude a route if it has closed and reopened, as this could have induced the 
treatment result I am looking for at a different time than I am analyzing. I consider a route as 
closed if it has fewer than 52 flights in a given year. 
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There were no flights opening in 2011 that meets the requirements. Therefore my dataset 
consists of flights that have opened from 2005-2010, and have not closed before or in 2012.  
Giroud (2012) included routes that got fewer stopovers or two shorter flights as treated routes. 
I choose not to do this, as most of Norway can be reached with two flights. Norway is also 
significantly smaller than the USA. Therefore a reduction in travel time caused by two shorter 
flights as opposed to two longer flights will be negligible.  
3.1.3 Area Clusters 
3.1.3.1 Postal Codes  
After identifying the airports at either end of the new routes, I need to connect the plants and 
headquarters with an airport. Bring (2014) provides me with a list of all postal codes in 
Norway, as well as a map with the postal code areas. Using this together with Google Maps 
identifies the closest airport to a postal code.  
3.1.3.2 Identifying Treated Areas 
Identifying which areas around an airport that benefit significantly from a direct route is 
subjective. When there are large areas between several airports and only one airport is treated, 
where the line between which areas are affected is drawn is highly subjective. I will illustrate 
this with an example. 
You have three airports, A, B and C, and six headquarters between them that all have plants 
near airport D, in a different part of Norway (see illustration 1). Then airport B gets a direct 
route to D. All the firms between airports ABC can either drive to airport B, or take a flight 
from A or C to B. Firm i is clearly better off. Firms j and l are right in between B and C, and 
therefore benefits from the treatment as they would drive the same distance either way. 
Whether firms k, n and m are better off however, depends on the tradeoff from driving versus 
taking two flights.  
 
 18
Figure 3-1 – Example Plant Locations 
 
The tradeoff of driving versus two flights, and its effect on treatment, depends on the size of 
area ABC. If it is the size of Finnmark and I am looking at the areas between the airports there, 
the impact on a 3 hours’ drive versus a 3 hours and 30 minutes’ drive to an airport is much 
less significant, than if ABC were three airports close together in the Oslo area and the 30 
minutes reduction was from 40 minutes to 10 minutes. 
I have attempted to be as thorough as possible when identifying the optimal route and which 
areas are significantly affected by a direct route. When finding the previous optimal travel 
time I have looked at both previously existing flights, and driving time to alternative airports. 
In general I have regarded a 30 minutes travel time reduction as a treated route. However 
between airports in closer proximity I allow a shorter time reduction, and in larger areas I 
require a larger reduction in travel time to constitute a treatment and significant travel time 
reduction. This is as stated a subjective assessment, and someone else might find different 
treated area clusters. 
A big assumption at this point is that firms have access to all available information and chose 
the optimal travel route. Flight prices and which day of the week a manager prefers to travel 
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are factors that I do not include. I include alternative flights and driving time by road when 
calculating travel time reductions. I do not include other public transport like trains or busses. 
I assume firms always chose the fastest travel route. 
When assessing the tradeoff between driving and taking two flights, I use the same flight 
assumptions as Giroud (2012). In addition to flight time, I assume one hour spent at destination 
and outgoing airport combined, and one hour spent per stopover. I attempted to find data on 
average stopover time on flights in Norway, but the Norwegian air traffic control, Avinor, had 
no data on this. I believe that Giroud’s assumptions hold in Norway as well. I only use these 
figures to identify the previous optimal route and therefore which areas are treated. They are 
not used in the analysis and therefore I believe these assumptions not to have an impact on my 
analysis. 
3.1.3.3 Area Clusters  
When I connect all the treated airports to an area, I get 10 treated clusters. I wish to connect 
all the plants in my dataset to a cluster. Therefore I connect the rest of the postal codes to its 
closest airport. If several airports in an area has no direct route to a treated airport, I treat the 
whole area as one control area. I end up with 18 area clusters in Norway. See Appendix 1 for 
a full list of postal code areas. 
After I label all the postal codes with a cluster dummy variable, I find many companies that 
do not have a postal code that is listed in Bring’s data set. Several companies have postal codes 
listed that no longer exist. After looking for old registries on postal codes I find another Bring 
(2014) data set with older postal codes. I believe the postal code was changed when an area 
changed name, as I cannot find the area names in the existing registry. I manage to match the 
old postal codes with existing postal codes by the municipality name, but I cannot know for 
sure that the postal codes are matched to the correct cluster, as municipalities often have 
several postal codes covering large areas. I assume this possibility to not affect my data set in 
a significant way. 
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3.2 Determining Variables 
3.2.1 Treatment and Control Groups 
There are 10 new direct routes that meet the requirements between 10 major cities. These 
routes are my 10 treated routes. Headquarters and plants located at either end of a treated route 
are in the treatment group.  
Figure 3-2 – Treated Routes 
 
The best comparison and control for a treated plant, is a plant which has its headquarter located 
within the same area, but with the plant at the end of a non-treated route. I use 18 area codes 
to identify clusters for both plant and headquarter location. I have 10 treated clusters that have 
one or more direct routes opening between them within the treatment window. The eight 
remaining clusters are control clusters that do not yet have a direct route to one or more of the 
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treated areas. Control routes can either exist between two treated areas that do not yet have a 
direct route between them, or between a treated area and a control area.  
I combine the 18 area codes of both the plant and headquarter into dummy variables to identify 
on which route they are located. This gives me 61 dummy variable combinations from the 
treated areas to other treated areas, or control areas. In total I have 10 treated routes and 51 
control routes, with 375 companies at either end of a treated route, and 667 companies in the 
control group. My dataset consists only of headquarters and plants where one part is located 
in a treated area, and the other entity is in another part of Norway. See appendix 2-4 for a full 
list of treatment and control routes, and the number of companies on each route. 
3.2.1.1 Distinction Between Headquarter and Plant Location 
I do not distinguish between whether the plant or the headquarter is located in the treated area. 
I illustrate why with a simple example. 
You have three areas, A, B and C. You have two companies, Red (R) and Green (G). In 
Situation 1 both headquarters are located in A, and the plants are located in B or C. Then a 
direct route opens between A and B. Company R is then treated while G is not. In Situation 2, 
G’s headquarter is in area C while its plant is in area A. The situation is unchanged; R is treated 
while G is not. The situation would also be the same if both plants were in area A and the 
headquarters were in areas B and C. Therefore I do not distinguish between at which end of a 
route the headquarter or plant is when comparing routes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 – Example Headquarter-Plant Locations 
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For simplicity when describing a route, I will from now on refer to one area as where the 
headquarters are located and the other end as where the plants are located, but it could just as 
easily be a combination of headquarters and plants at either end. 
3.2.1.2 Clarification on Clusters and Groups 
It is important to distinguish between clusters and treated- or control-groups. The clusters are 
the 18 area codes that I have divided Norway into according to relevant airports. There are 10 
clusters that are on the end of one or more treated routes. There are 61 routes between clusters 
that have either been treated or still is untreated. Out of those 61 routes, 10 are treated and 51 
are control-routes. The firms at either end of a route are either in the treatment group or the 
control group. A cluster area can therefore contain firms from different treated routes, and 
control firms. 
3.2.2 Industry Codes 
The Norwegian Corporate Accounts database includes information on which industry the firm 
operates in. There are two sets of industry codes, SN2002 and SN2007. They are two- or five-
digit numbers representing the industry code. SN2007 replaces the initial classification. My 
dataset includes both classifications for the relevant sampling period. There are however some 
missing classifications in SN2007 in the early years of my sampling period. There are no 
missing values on SN2002, and therefore I use the 5-digit SN2002 to cassify my firms.  
There are 12 industry groups in SN2002. I assign 12 dummy variables to the firms according 
to the industry group. The three largest industry groups are manufacturing, trade, and 
services/real estate/advisors. They make up 79% of my dataset. They are, however, quite 
dissimilar industries, and analyzing only those three industries will in my opinion not give a 
better sample dataset than by using all 12 industries. Giroud chose to only look at the 
manufacturing sector in the USA in his study. Norway is a smaller country and I have a 
significantly smaller sample. I therefore chose to initially include all firms in my analysis, and 
then do individual analyses on relevant sectors as well. See appendix 5 for a list of all the 
SN2002 industry codes and groups. 
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Figure 3-4 - Distribution of Industries in Dataset 
 
3.3 Methods of Calculating Profitability and Investment 
I have a limited number of observations in my sample. I therefore wish to look at different 
variables and measures for profitability to get a broader basis for drawing conclusions. 
3.3.1 Return on Assets 
The main focus of my analysis is on the return on assets. The return on assets (ROA) of a firm 
measures its operating efficiency in generating profits from its assets (Damodaran, 2002). This 
ratio combines the profit margin and asset turnover, indication both the profit-generating 
strength and efficiency in utilizing assets (Needles and Powers, 2011). I calculate ROA as: 
Net Income
Net Sales
×
Net Sales
Average Total Assets
=
Net Income
Average Total Assets
 
Profit Margin × Asset Turnover = Return on Assets 
Return on Assets =
Net Income
Average Total Assets
 
Equation 3-1 Return on Assets 
(Needles and Powers, 2011). 
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ROA consists of two parts. From the income statement I find the numerator net income, which 
is a measure of the firm’s profitability during the period (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). For the 
denominator I calculate the average total assets as the year average, where I use the closing 
balance of the previous year as opening balance. The closing balance is the relevant closing 
balance in that year (Powers and Needles, 2011). I include the closing balance of 2002 as the 
opening balance of 2003 to keep 2003 in my sample.  
An advantage to ROA as a performance measure, is that it is less sensitive to leverage than 
return on equity (Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). ROAs mayor strength is that it reflects both the 
profit margin and asset turnover, and is why it is one of the most widely used measures of 
profitability (Needles and Powers, 2011). A potential weakness is if a plant has substantial 
current assets, which understated the profitability of the plant. This can be solved by looking 
at industry-average ROAs to compare ROAs from similar industries (Needles and Powers, 
2011). 
3.3.2 Operating Margin and EBITDA Margin 
The Norwegian Corporate Accounts (NCA) database includes some generated variables as 
well. As I have a limited sample set, I wish to look at several measurements of profitability to 
look for trends. Two measurements I wish to look at are the EBITDA margin and operating 
margin. The NCA calculates them as: 
Equation 3-2 EBITDA margin 
EBITDA Margin =
EBITDA
Total Income
 
Equation 3-3 Operating Margin 
Operating Margin =
Operating Profit/Loss
Total Income
 
Where: 
Total Income comprises of all income the company receives during the period. 
Operating Profit/Loss is total income minus all operating expenses. 
EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization. 
 
My three measurements of profitability are highly correlated, but gives different insights. The 
operating margin or profit margin shows how much remain in the company per NOK in 
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revenues after all costs linked to operations are covered, but before the financial items (NCA, 
2013). EBITDA is the operating profit/loss plus depreciation and amortization. Net Income 
includes all income and expenses, and is the total profit/loss for the company.  
3.3.3 Plant Investment and Profitability 
Giroud (2012) looked at investment as a function of total capital expenditures divided by 
capital stock. NCA includes information about plant level investment, as investment in 
subsidiaries. This is interesting to look at in relation to treatment. I wish to look at investment 
both in absolute terms and the profitability of investment in relative terms. The NCA dataset 
contains information on income from investments in subsidiaries, which could be used to 
measure profitability. Unfortunately the dataset has very few registered observations on this. 
Therefore to get investment in relative terms to compare, I measure this profitability as a 
function of plant profits and headquarter investment. My function on profitability is:  
Equation 3-4 Profitability 
Investment Profitability =  
Net Income
Investment in Subsidiary
 
Here I look at the direct investment from headquarters (input), in relation to net income 
(output). The profitability measure shows how well the plant utilizes the investment it receives 
from the headquarter. 
3.3.3.1 Weakness in Plant level Investment 
Here I must recognize a significant weakness in my sample set. In the NCA database all 
information is linked to the specific company. Each plant has one headquarter listed. 
Identifying a plant’s headquarter is therefore simple. When looking at plant investment 
however, I must find the information in the headquarters’ financial statement listed as 
“investment in subsidiary”, and link it to the plant and define it as “investment from 
headquarter”. The problem is that while one plant can only have one headquarter, a 
headquarter can have several plants. Linking the investment to the correct plant to reflect 
whether it represents an investment in a treated or control route, is therefore difficult. The 
database contains no information on subsidiary organization numbers, or the number of 
subsidiaries one particular headquarter owns. 
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To bypass this problem, I look for duplicates in headquarter organization numbers (Baum, 
2009). I identify plants that have a unique headquarter organization number. When there is 
only one headquarter organization number registered to one plant in my dataset, I assume that 
the headquarter only owns one plant, and that the investment is going to that plant. There is 
no way of knowing whether the investment goes to that precise plant, but I think it is a 
reasonable assumption and that any deviations do not affect my results. 
This limits the number of companies in my dataset. Because I can not know how the 
investment is divided if there is more than one plant with the same headquarter, and therefore 
can not single out the effect of treatment, I drop any duplicate observations. 
To avoid narrowing down my entire dataset, I use different datasets when I analyze 
profitability, and when I analyze investment. The investment dataset without headquarter 
duplicates contains 1905 observations from 441 companies, where the major dataset contains 
5030 observations from 869 companies. 
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4. Methodology  
4.1.1 Difference-in-Difference  
To examine the effects on plant-level investment and profitability, I use a difference-in-
difference approach. The Difference-in-difference (DID) approach is a method used for 
calculating the difference between two groups where one has been randomly selected to 
receive a treatment. It is commonly used to analyze the effect of a policy or law on a 
population. Card and Krueger (1994) analyzed the effect of minimum wage on labor demand 
using a DID-methodology. 
DID-estimation looks at two groups that in nature are similar, where one is treated and the 
other is not (Wooldridge, 2012). You wish to single out the effect of the treatment. You look 
at the point in time when one group was treated, and compare the means of the treated group 
before and after treatment, with the means of the control group before and after the time of 
treatment. Subtracting the treated group difference with the control group difference, you get 
a difference-in-difference estimator (Stock and Watson, 2010). This DID-estimator, δ is what 
I am looking for.  
A key element of the DID-analysis is dummy variables that identify the group and time of the 
observations (Albouy, 2005). I have two sets of dummy variables.  
 
Treatment = 1 if observation is in the treatment group, 0 if in control group. 
After = 1 if the observation is from a year after the treatment has occurred, 0 if before. 
 
This gives a third dummy-variable, the interaction variable: 
 
Interaction = Treatment x After = 1 if an observation is both in the treatment group, and 
after the treatment has occurred. 
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Combining the DID-estimator and dummy variables I get the following regression model: 
Equation 4-1 Regression Model 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + δ × 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable of interest (plant investment or profitability) 
 i indexes plants 
 t indexes years 
 𝛼 = constant term 
 𝛽𝑖 = plant fixed effects  
 𝛾𝑡 = year fixed effects  
 δ = true effect of treatment 
 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the dummy variable Treatment x After 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term 
 
There are many steps taken before I get to this regression model. However, I find presenting 
the model before explaining the different elements to get there, gives a better insight to my 
approach. 
4.1.2 Difference in Difference Estimator, δ 
To assertain the effect of the treatment, I need to fint the DID-estimator. Each observation 
falls into one of four categories within two dimensions, treated and non-treated (control), and 
before and after the treatment. Each observation can have four elements affecting it (Albouy, 
2005). 
 α is the starting point of the observation, the constant 
 β accounts for the average permanent differences between the treatment and 
control group 
 γ is the time trend common to the control and treatment group, the time difference 
before and after treatment 
 δ is the effect of the treatment 
 
I am interested in the average of the observations in each of the four categories. 
?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒   = α 
?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒   = α + βtreatment 
?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = α + γAfter 
?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 = α + βTreatment +γAfter + δ 
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4.1.1.1 Simple Treatment-Control Estimation and Causality of Airline 
Routes 
If I look only at the differences between the control- and treatment-group, while ignoring the 
pre-treatment outcomes, I get: 
δ2 = (?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 −  ?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟) 
δ2 = [α + β + γ + δ] − [α + γ] = β + δ 
Equation 4-2 – Difference in Groups 
The estimation will be biased if β ≠ 0. If there is an inherit difference between the control- and 
treatment-group, this will influence the treatment effect I find (Albouy, 2005). One thing that 
is important to consider here in relation to my analysis is the causality between location of 
plants, and the opening of new airline routes. The DID-approach requires groups to be 
randomly selected (Stock and Watson, 2010). If one group is chosen because of certain 
characteristics, this influences the causality between the treatment-group and treatment effect 
found. The groups need not have the same average or starting point before treatment, but the 
groups cannot be chosen on the basis of the starting point or on the level of predicted effect of 
the treatment.  
Assuming that the choice of destinations of new airline routes (and thereby defining two 
connected areas as treated) is completely random would be naïve. An airline opens a new flight 
route depending on where it assumes it can get the highest profit, where most people 
assumingly will travel to or from. An area with thriving business will probably have a higher 
growth rate, and attract airlines more than sparse areas will. This could lead to a false positive 
result when analyzing the interaction effect, as the direct route could have nothing to do with 
for example a higher return on assets in the treatment group. 
One thing that could counteract the effect of difference in the groups, is the fact that the 
location of plants are choice variables. All the companies in my sample are located at either 
end of routes that were untreated at some point in my sample period. Each headquarter chose 
the location of the plant it thought optimal. It chose not to locate it at the end of a direct route. 
I assume that the headquarters are profit maximizing and rational actors, and therefore that 
their choices of locations reflect a similar environment for treated- and control-groups. I 
assume any inherent differences in the control- and treatment-group are small and do not affect 
my analysis. 
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4.1.1.2 Simple Before-After Estimation 
If I look only at the differences in averages before and after the treatment, in only the treatment 
group, I get: 
δ1 = (?̅?
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
− ?̅?
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
) 
= [α + β + γ + δ] − [α + β] = γ + δ 
Equation 4-3 - Difference in Treatment Group 
This means that the estimation will be biased as long as γ ≠ 0. If there is a time trend 
affecting?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟, this will be considered as part of the treatment effect (Albouy, 
2005).  
4.1.1.3 The Unbiased DID-estimator 
Using the DID-estimator has the advantage of eliminating pre-treatment differences in Y 
between the treatment and control group (Stock and Watson, 2010). When taking the 
difference in averages between both the groups and time periods, you get the unbiased effect 
of the treatment, δ: 
δ = (?̅?
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
− ?̅?
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
) − (?̅?
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
− ?̅?
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
) 
δ =  ∆?̅?
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
− ∆?̅?
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
 
Equation 4-4 The DID-Estimator 
Illustration of DID-estimator, δ 
 Before After After – Before 
Treatment group α + βTreatment 
α + βTreatment + 
γAfter + δ 
γAfter + δ 
Control group α α + γAfter γAfter 
Treatment – Control βTreatment βTreatment  + δ δ 
 
(Wooldridge, 2012) 
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4.2 Econometric Issues 
I now have the regression model: 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + δ × 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀 
Equation 4-5 - Simple Regression Model 
Here I state that the return on assets is only dependent on a constant starting point, the effect 
of treatment, whether or not a firm is treated, and the error term. Assuming that these are the 
only affecting factors determining the return on assets is not reasonable. To be sure any results 
I find in my analysis are correct and represent the actual treatment effect, I need to do several 
tests and adjustments to my regression model. Ignoring these issues can overestimate the test 
statistics and give biased and false results. 
4.2.1 Plant and Year Fixed Effects 
Fixed effect regression is a method to control for omitted variables affecting panel data (Stock 
and Watson, 2010). Panel data is a dataset in which entities are observed across time. Panel 
data allows you to control for variables you can not observe or measure, and account for 
individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2008). If I believe there is correlation between an 
unobservable effect and the explanatory variables in my panel data, I need to adjust for these 
effects. There are two relevant fixed effects I need to consider; firm fixed effects and time 
fixed effects.  
Firm fixed effects are effects that vary across entities (plants), but remain constant over time 
(Stock and Watson, 2010). An example of a firm specific trait can be an exceptionally good 
location of a store. This location does not vary over time, but leads to abnormally high returns 
for that particular store. This must be singled out from the treatment effect. To control for 
fixed effects for each of my plants, I get N binary (or indicator) variables that absorb all 
omitted variables that vary across entities, but remain constant over time (Stock and Watson, 
2010). These give me N different intercepts, one for each entity: 
𝛽𝑖 =  𝜇 + 𝛽1𝑍𝑖 
Equation 4-6 Plant Intercepts 
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I wish to incorporate firm specific effects into my regression model. I ignore the constant and 
the error term for a moment to simplify the model, and get: 
𝑌𝑖 = δ × 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜇 +  𝛽1𝑍𝑖  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, and I wish to estimate δ, the effect on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 of 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, holding 
constant the firm characteristics Z (Stock and Watson, 2010). Simplified, I wish to analyze the 
effect of treatment (δ), on ROA (𝑌𝑖𝑡), from being treated (identified by the dummy-variable 
interaction), holding constant all firm-specific effects. This gives me the fixed effect 
regression model: 
Equation 4-7 Regression Model with Firm Fixed Effects 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 + δ × 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  
Where 𝛽1 … 𝛽𝑛 are treated as unknown intercepts to be estimated, one for each plant (Stock 
and Watson, 2010). 
Time fixed effects are the same as firm fixed effects, only they are effects that remain constant 
across firms and changes over time. These are economic trends like booms and recessions that 
affect all firms over time. Like with firm fixed effects, I use binary variables that indicate 
different sample years. This gives me the regression model: 
   Equation 4-8 Regression Model with Firm and Time Fixed Effects 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + δ × 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For t = 1,...,T and i = 1,…,N   
Where 𝛾𝑡 is the year fixed effect following the same logic and method as firm fixed effects 
do. You can see that the firm fixed effects only varies across firms, i, and time fixed effects 
only varies across time, t. 
4.2.2 Random Effects Model 
There are two assumptions about individual specific effects, the random assumption and the 
fixed assumption. In the fixed effects model, the goal is to eliminate firm and year fixed effects 
influencing the model, because it is assumed to be correlated with one or more of the 
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independent variables. If however the individual specific effects are uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variable across all time periods, using a transformation to eliminate the 
unobserved effect will result in inefficient estimators (Wooldridge, 2012). If I assume no 
correlation, the random effects regression model would include all the fixed effects 
assumption, plus the additional assumption of zero correlation. 
To determine whether random effects assumptions need to be added to my regression model, 
I look at the nature of my panel data. If for example the key explanatory variable is constant 
over time, I can not use fixed effects to estimate its effect on the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2012). If the unobserved variable (fixed effect) is unchanging over time, then 
any changes in the dependent variable must be due to influences other than these fixed 
characteristics (Stock and Watson, 2010).  
Using random effects when the interest is in a time-varying explanatory variable, is rarely the 
right choice. A situation where the covariance is zero is the exception to the rule (Wooldridge, 
2012). As I am comparing data before and after an event, it is reasonable to assume that there 
are fixed effects that correlate with my explanatory variables.  
To be sure that a fixed effects model is the right choice, I do a Hausman test on my data set 
(Baum, 2008). In the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is that the unique errors are not 
correlated with the regressors (the difference in coefficients is not systematic). If FE estimation 
is sufficiently close to RE estimation, one is indifferent to which is used. Random effects 
estimates are used unless the Hausman test is rejected (Woodrige, 2012). Fixed effects would 
still be correct, but inefficient. 
When conducting the Hausman test, I find a statistically significant (to the fifth percentile) 
difference in random and fixed effects. Therefore, using the fixed effect regression model is 
correct for my dataset. 
4.2.3 Testing for Time Fixed Effects 
I need to test whether there are any time fixed effects that I need to include in my fixed effects 
model. I test whether the dummies for all years are equal to zero (Baum, 2008). The null 
hypothesis is the all the year-dummies are zero, and therefore no time fixed effects are needed. 
I find that the dummies are statistically different than zero to the one-percentile. Therefore I 
reject the null-hypothesis, and keep the time-fixed effects in my regression model. 
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4.2.4 Testing for Serial Correlation 
The standard errors of the coefficients can appear to be smaller than they are, and the R-
squared higher, if there is serial correlation present in the dataset. If the errors are correlated 
over time, they suffer from serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2012). Usually serial correlation 
applies to macro panels with long time series (20-30 years), and is usually not a problem in 
micro panels. However with difference-in-difference estimations, serial correlation is an 
important concern (Giroud, 2012). There are three factors that make serial correlation with 
DID-analysis an important issue (Bertrand et.al. 2004): 
1. It often relies on long time series. 
2. Serial correlation between dependent variables 
3. Treatment variables changes little within time window 
Furthermore, Bertrand et. al. points out that these three factors reinforce each other. The 
standard error for the estimated treatment effect could significantly understate its standard 
deviation and overestimate the test statistics. I do a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data to test for serial correlation, where the null is no serial correlation. This test shows 
a strong presence of serial correlation in my dataset. I include clustered standard errors in my 
regression model to account for serial correlation.  
4.2.5 Testing for Heteroskedasticity 
I need to test for heteroskedasticity in my dataset. If the variance of the error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is the 
same given any value of the explanatory variables, there is homoskedasticity (Wooldridge, 
2012). If the error 𝜀𝑖𝑡 has a different variance given any value of the explanatory variables, 
there is heteroskedasticity present in my dataset (Stock and Watson, 2010), and I need to adjust 
for this in my regression model. 
I do a Modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
to test for heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis is constant variance (homoskesdasticity). I 
reject the null, and find heteroskedasticity in my dataset. I include heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors (Wooldridge, 2012) into my regression model. 
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4.2.6 Clustered Robust Standatrd Errors 
Like Giroud (2012), I cluster standard errors to account for the presence of serial correlation. 
This accounts for both serial correlation within same plant, and correlation of the error term 
across plants in a given year, as well as over time (Giroud, 2012). My robust clustered standard 
errors accounts for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and is close to the true 
standard error. I cluster standard errors at the postal code area cluster level. This takes any 
correlation pattern within a geographical area into account.  
4.2.7 Winsorization of Variables 
To account for outliers in datasets there are several methods to insure the results reflect the 
dataset as a whole as much as possible. Analyses on datasets with long tails can give skewered 
results. One method is to simply drop any observations exceeding an absolute limit or relative 
to the dataset. Another method is Winsorization of the dataset. This can reduce the effect of 
outliers on statistical analysis (Shete et. al. 2004).  
When Winsorizing a dataset, you take any observations exceeding a pre-determined level, and 
gives it the value of the observation at that level for a more representative dataset. For example 
if you wish to change the one percent highest and lowest observations in a dataset, all those 
observations take the value of the 99% and 1% observations. I Winsorize my dependent 
variables at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile. This gives me a significantly more representative 
dataset, as is illustrated by before and after Winsorization of my return on assets: 
ROA before Winsorization:     ROA after Winsorization: 
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When winsorizing the dataset in the profitability analyses, I winsorize after calculating the 
ROA or finding the operating margin and EBITDA-margin, to better reflect the firm’s 
numerator and denominator in a given year. With the investment from headquarter, I only have 
one figure. I therefore winsorize the investment from headquarter before I analyse, to deal 
with outliers. When calculating the profits deriving from said investment, I first calculate the 
profitability in each year using the original investment figures, then winsorize the results 
afterwards. 
4.2.8 Criticism of Methodology 
To fit the analysis I wish to do into the scope of a master thesis, I have made some 
simplifications that can affect my results. It is important to recognize the weakness this puts 
on my results. 
4.2.8.1 Travel Time Reduction 
I analyse the effect of reduced travel time on the managing of and investment in plants. I have 
defined a plant as treated or non-treated and analysed it based on this distinction. To find the 
true effect of reduction in travel time per hour or minute, I must include time-effects according 
to the reduction in travel time for each firm in my analysis. I could then see if a larger reduction 
in travel time has a greater impact than a small reduction. This would be very time-consuming 
to add as a factor for each firm, and therefore I have not made this distinction. I try to define 
a firm as treated in accordance with logic and previously optimal travel route, to see if a new 
flight route constitutes a true improvement to a firm.  
4.2.8.2 Industry-Adjusted Codes 
The Norwegian Corporate Accounts includes information on industry codes. There are two-
digit and five-digit codes defining in which industry a company operates in. Some industries 
hold more fixed assets than others, and therefore has a different return on assets than others. 
As return on assets vary across industries and is cyclical, including industry-adjusted ROAs 
over time will give a better basis for comparisons. Subtracting the industry-median in a given 
year will single out the true effect (Giroud, 2012). I have ten years of financial data. In NCAs 
dataset there are 966 different groups in the five-digit category, 59 different groups in the two-
digit category, and 12 different industry groups that the five-digit industry codes are divided 
into (see appendix 5). Including this in my data set would give me: 
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For five-digit: 966*10 = 9 660 industry-adjusted codes  
For two-digit: 59*10 = 590 industry-adjusted codes 
For 12 different groups: 12*10 = 120 industry-adjusted codes 
Equation 4-9 Industry Adjusted Codes 
This has to be done for each of the effects I wish to analyse; ROA, EBITDA margin, operating 
margin, investment level and investment profitability. This is unfortunately beyond the scope 
of this paper, and needs to be recognized as a weakness that could occur. I use the 12 different 
groups based on the five-digit SN02-codes in my analysis. I do individual analyses on the three 
largest groups (manufacturing, trade, services/real estate/advisors) to find trends, to mitigate 
the weakness of not including industry-adjusted factors in my regression. 
4.2.8.3 Several Treatments in one Area 
An area in my analysis, is the geographical area where the firms within are affected by the 
routes offered at a nearby airport. An airport can open several new routes to different 
destinations, within my treatment window. Therefore firms in that area can be treated at 
different times. The control companies are those that are not treated at all, that have a plant 
located at an area that does not have a direct route in my relevant time window. Because of 
this, the treatment can occur at different times for different companies, while the control 
companies stay the same. The inclusion of time-fixed effects takes care of this problem. It 
does not matter that for example, a firm A can be treated in 2008 and be compared with firm 
X in 2008, a firm B can still be treated in 2010 and be compared to firm X in 2010. 
4.2.8.4 Number of Clusters 
The clustered robust standard errors may be biased if the number of clusters is too small 
(Petersen, 2005). I have 18 area clusters that I cluster the standard errors in. According to 
Petersen, 10 clusters is too small and 500 is sufficient. Giroud (2012) had over 500 clusters, 
while I have only 18. This number is too small, and this weakness can lead to understated 
standard errors in my analysis. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Reasons for New Flight Routes 
The simple answer to the motivation of opening a new flight route, is profits. Airlines are 
profit-maximising companies that open new routes where they think they can get the highest 
profits, where they assume most people will want to travel to and from. Beyond this point, 
there are three factors to consider: the restraint in number of airplanes, competition on a route, 
and air rights.  
5.1.1 Restraint in Number of Airplanes 
Airplanes are not built overnight. There is a large backlog and waiting time for airplanes to be 
delivered. Norwegian Air Shuttle is waiting for 240 planes to be delivered (Lorentzen, 2015). 
A limited number of airplanes in the fleet puts a restraint on how many routes you can operate 
and how often a route is travelled. The airlines try to optimize the profit given this restraint, 
offering the most profitable routes often, but still offering a wide network of routes. 
5.1.2 Competition on Individual Routes 
There are finite numbers of people wishing to travel on a route. This number is divided among 
the flights offered within a relevant time period. In addition to the factors of Bonus Points and 
personal preferences, customers are price sensitive and usually chose the cheapest flight 
offered. For an airline, the fixed costs involving a single flight is hefty, while the cost for each 
additional passenger is very low. The cost of flying with empty seats is therefore great. When 
opening a new route, or increasing the number of flights on an existing route, an airline 
therefore needs to consider the competition on that specific route. Flooding the market on 
profitable routes lowers the price, and the profits.  
5.1.3 Air Rights  
Opening a new route is not a simple process. Air traffic is highly monitored and taxed by the 
government. The rights to operate a route need to be purchased or granted. This can be a 
difficult process, especially on international routes where domestic firms are often favoured.  
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5.1.4 Lobbying by Companies and Private Jets 
One thing to consider with causality between the opening of direct routes and increased 
monitoring, is whether the firms themselves have influenced the decision to open a new airline. 
More densely populated areas and areas with more business are preferred destinations for 
airlines. If however, the companies with plants at either end of a route have affected this choice 
through lobbying to the airlines, this could dilute the effect of proximity on profitability. The 
causality needs to be established. When looking at my final data set, I do not believe the few 
companies at either end have influenced the choice in the treated routes. Cities where the most 
influential and numerous companies are located, like Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim, already 
have numerous direct flights between them. I do not believe this affects my findings. 
Private company jets are substitutes to public transport, a substitute to using the airline routes 
in my data set. If the use of private jets to transport management was widespread in Norway, 
this could undermine my findings. This is, however, a luxury few private persons or companies 
have access to. I do not think the use of private jets in Norway affects my analysis. 
5.1.5 Tourism and Technology 
In the dataset I received from Avinor, it was specified that the flight information I had access 
to did not include charter flights. The dataset only includes information on flights transporting 
people, not charter or goods transport. When I analyse the effect of the opening of a new direct 
air route, I therefore know that the effect is not due to the increased transportation of goods 
and equipment, but of people.  
Improvements in technology like videoconferences and electronic monitoring systems, can 
over time reduce the need and effect of personal monitoring. In his study, Giroud (2012) 
covered the period 1977-2005. During this time, improvements in technology were significant 
and he found that the treatment effect of personal monitoring was higher in the earlier years 
of his study. My time period of ten years is significantly narrower. Though technology has 
improved since 2005 (my first treated flight), I do not believe it to have affected my results in 
a significant way. 
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5.2 Example: Bergen Airport, Flesland 
The route Bergen-Oslo is the second most travelled route in Norway, between Oslo-
Trondheim and Oslo-Stavanger (from flight route statistics dataset). Bergen, Flesland is the 
second largest airport in Norway, with 19 domestic routes transporting over three million 
passengers in 2014. Bergen is a key part in my analysis. Four out of the ten routes opening in 
my time window include Bergen as one of the two relevant areas. In 2004 there were 13 routes, 
while five routes have opened and closed or have fallen outside my treatment window. With 
Bergen being a large city with a substantial population, finding routes connected to Bergen is 
central to gaining a sufficient number of treated firms. 
The four treated routes connected to Bergen, and their previously optimal routes, are: 
Figure 5-1 – Treated firms - Bergen 
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In figure 5.1, the blue lines represent new routes, while the green lines represent the previously 
optimal routes for those four destinations. The two northern cities Bodø and Tromsø were 
previously both reachable through Trondheim and a direct flight from there. Bergen-Skien and 
Bergen-Moss are special cases. This is because the new routes came from the opening of new 
airports, Moss Rygge and Skien Geiteryggen. The previous optimal route therefore entailed 
flying to the closest airport, then driving by road from there. The relevant reduction in travel 
time is therefore the driving time to the closest airport. This is not the actual reduction in travel 
time for all companies, as they are located widespread around the treated airport. As previously 
discussed this does not affect my analysis as I only use the location to identify which routes a 
company is affected by, not as a function of reduction in travel time. 
 
Figure 5-2 – Travel time reductions – Bergen 
Area 1 Area 2 Opening year Previous Destination After Treatment Before Treatment Time saved 
Bergen Moss 2008 Oslo (car) 55 131 76 
Bergen Skien 2005 Sandefjord (car) 55 101 46 
Bergen Bodø 2008 Trondheim 110 180 70 
Bergen Tromsø 2007 Trondheim 140 225 85 
 
In addition to these four treated routes, my Bergen-dataset includes three control routes to 
Brønnlysund, Harstad/narvik and Alta/Finmark that does not yet have a direct route from 
Bergen. This dataset consists of 128 companies with 845 observations, giving an average 
number of 6,6 observations per plant. The number of clusters are Bergen + Treated + Control 
= 1+4+3 = 8 clusters. I do my entire analysis on the Bergen-dataset, and get some interesting 
results. 
5.2.1 Profitability Measurements 
One of the most interesting findings from this example, is the return on assets. Return on assets 
shows a firm’s ability to allocate its resources to generate profit. In my analysis of Bergen, I 
find a DID-estimator of 3.86%. This means that through the differences in differences analysis, 
I find a positive increase in the return on assets derived from being treated, of 3.86%. This 
result is significant to the 5th percentile, and constitutes the real increase in return on assets 
(within the limits of my analysis). This finding is very interesting. It shows the overall 
improvement of plants in the Bergen region from closer proximity to headquarter. It shows 
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economic growth in a geographical area, and represents the economic benefits of having an 
airport with direct flight routes for an area. 
I did the same analysis on the EBITDA- and operating-margin. I find a 4.60% increase in the 
EBITDA margin, and a 1.18% increase in the operating margin. This strengthens my previous 
finding that proximity through direct flights improves profitability, but unfortunately neither 
of these results were statistically significant. This means that I cannot conclude that these 
increases come from the treatment effect. 
I present my findings in a table below. I chose not to include all year fixed-effects in the figure, 
simply for an easier presentation of the key findings for each analysis. 
Figure 5-3 – Bergen Profitability Results 
 
ROA 
EBITDA 
Margin 
Operating 
Margin  
        
Treatment Effect 0.0386** 0.0460 0.0118 
 (0.0166) (0.0788) (0.1277) 
    
Constant 0.0489** 0.0093  -0.0705 
 (0.0171) (0.0743) (0.0745) 
        
    
Number of observations 845 734 734 
Number of groups 128 118 118 
Avg. plant-year obs. 6.6 6.2 6.2 
    
R2 within 0.0328 0.0164 0.0106 
R2 between 0.0070 0.1344 0.1707 
R2 overall 0.0159 0.0287 0.0194 
    
        
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses   
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01   
 
I do all three profitability analyses on each of the three largest industries as well. I find that 
for example, for real estate/services/advisors, there is an improvement of 2.09% in the 
operating margin. All nine analyses show similar trends for the three groups and profitability 
measures. The number of firms in each industry in Bergen is small however. Neither of the 
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groups have more than 50 firms, and none of the results are statistically significant in the 
Bergen area alone. 
5.2.2 Investment Level 
In the investment level analysis I look at the investments in subsidiaries that the headquarters 
state in their financial report. I look at both the changes in investment in NOK, and the relative 
profitability derived from the investment the plant receives. Not knowing which plant 
receiving an investment, limits my data set to headquarters with just a single plant, assuming 
that this plant receives the whole investment. 
Here I find another interesting result; the investment in NOK-terms when a firm is treated 
decreased by over NOK 120 000. This is highly statistically significant, to the 1st percentile. 
This means that when the proximity between headquarter and plant increased, the investment 
in the plant decreased. This is different from what Giroud (2012) found in his analysis. He 
found that investment increased when measured as capital expenditure over capital stock. I 
have used the figure the headquarter itself has listed as investment in subsidiaries, and that has 
decreased with treatment. Possible reasons for this effect will be discussed under my main 
analysis.  
I did a regression on the profitability deriving from the investment from headquarter, as a 
function of net income over received investment. This profitability shows how well the plant 
utilizes the investment it receives, and allocates it to gain profits. I found that profitability 
increased with 5.31% from the treatment. This was not statistically significant, and I can 
therefore not conclude that the increased profitability stems from the treatment. But if it did, 
this would mean that proximity lead to less, but better investment. 
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Figure 5-4 – Bergen Investment 
 
Investment Profitability 
 
      
Treatment Effect  -120 137*** 0.0531 
 (32 397.52) (0.0281) 
   
Constant 17 450  -0.3377 
 (33 430.25) (0.2797) 
      
   
Number of Observations 351 351 
Number of Groups 79 79 
Avg. plant-year obs.  4.4   4.4  
   
R2 within 0.1082 0.0485 
R2 between 0.0757 0.0125 
R2 overall 0.0637 0.0136 
   
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01  
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5.3 Main Results 
In this paper I have done several analyses on profitability and investment. I look at both a 
national and a regional level, as well as at the three largest industries in my sample. I use a 
differences in differences approach to compare two groups of firms before and after a 
treatment. The treatment is the opening of a new direct airline route between the firm’s 
headquarter and plant. A direct route means that management can travel faster to and from the 
plants, and therefore can monitor the plants more easily. This improvement in proximity has 
different effects that I wish to analyze. I have found several interesting trends that I will now 
present. 
5.3.1 Return on Assets 
When I analyze the return on assets on the national level on my whole dataset, I find that the 
result are not statistically significant. To be able to uncover trends and conclude, I therefore 
do several different analyses. I do ten analyses on the ten different treated regions, five 
analyses on the five different years flights were opened, and three analyses on the three largest 
industries. This gives me a good basis to uncover significant trends on different grounds and 
groups. Because I do the different analyses on different groups, the combination of treatment 
and control groups vary, giving different grounds for comparisons. See appendix 6-8 for a full 
list of the ROA regression results. 
5.3.1.1 Ten Analyses on Regional Level 
With the regional analyses, like in the Bergen example, I look at all the treated and control 
routes that origins from one treated airport. All the firms in these analyses has either its plant 
or headquarter in the relevant region. These analyses are therefore the closest comparisons of 
companies with similar location-specific economic factors. Most of the analyses show a 
positive trend following treatment. Five of the ten regional analyses are statistically 
significant, whereas three, Skien, Bergen and Tromsø, show a positive result of a 3-9% 
increase in ROA. Two areas, Kristiansund and Bodø has a negative effect of 5% on ROA after 
treatment (See appendix 6 for all results).  
5.3.1.2 Five Year-Specific Analyses 
In the year-specific analyses, I compare the firms being treated in a specific year, with all the 
control companies in the whole dataset. These are therefore done with a larger control group. 
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In some years only one route is opened, while in for example 2008, four different routes were 
opened. I do the regressions on all the years I have plant level data on, the year-specific 
analysis only defines which treated companies are included in each analysis. The treatment 
effects on return on assets in these analyses, are for most between 0.4% and 1.8%. One is -
1.3% but is not statistically significant. All the constants are statistically significant to the 1st 
percentile, but only the treatment effect on the routes opening in 2007 were statistically 
significant. The route opening between Bergen and Tromsø in 2007 had an increase in ROA 
of 10.52%, which was statistically significant to the 1st percentile (See appendix 7 for all 
results). 
5.3.1.3 Three Industry Specific Analyses 
I do three analyses on the three largest industry groups; manufacturing, trade, and services/ 
real estate/ advisors. I find a treatment effect of -0.1% to 3.8%, but none of the results are 
statistically significant, and therefore does not give additional insight to the treatment effect 
on return on assets (See appendix 8 for all results). 
5.3.1.4 Treatment effect on Return on Assets 
The main findings on the 18 ROA-analyses, are those of the five statistically significant treated 
areas, and the route opening in 2007. The route Tromsø-Bergen, opening in 2007, is both the 
only treated route from the Tromsø-area, and the only treated route that opened in 2007. I find 
a positive increase of about 10% for both analyses (significant to the 1st percentile). That 
means that both compared to the other control firms in Tromsø, and compared to the entire 
dataset, this route had a significantly positive effect on the return on assets. There were two 
routes opening in 2005, both from the Skien-area. Looking only at the Skien-area I find a 
significant positive effect of 7.5%. When analysing both these routes with the whole dataset, 
I find an increase of 1.7%. That is however only significant to the 20th percentile, and therefore 
can not be given too much weight. In the Bergen area, with three treated routes, I find a positive 
increase of 3.9%.  
Looking at all the analyses together, I find strong evidence that the opening of a direct route 
between two areas leads to a positive effect on the return on assets. 
There are two areas that have a significant negative treatment effect when compared to firms 
in the same area; Kristiansund and Bodø. There can be several reasons to why improvement 
in proximity can lead to lower profitability. If irrationally based home-bias leads management 
 47 
to invest in plants, solely on the basis that they are more familiar with it, that can lead to 
suboptimal allocation of funds. Over-management can also be a reason. If a manager visits 
more often, and needs to justify his monitoring with making changes to the plant, he can take 
the plant away from an optimal strategy. 
5.3.1.5 Different regression model 
I try a different regression model to test if there are assumptions or parts of my regression 
model I can exclude and get significant results on a national level. I run a regression on my 
whole dataset, with my model and the year fixed effects, but excluding the firm fixed effects. 
I get statistically significant results to the 1st percentile, of a positive treatment effect of 2.81% 
(See appendix 18). This means that there is an overall positive difference in ROA of the two 
groups before and after the treatment (DID-analysis). Because I excluded the plant-specific 
effects this effect may come from an inherent difference in the firms. Whether this inherent 
difference comes from the treatment, or the airlines chose the destinations based on this 
difference in groups, the effect is still there. The causality of the difference in firms (firm-
fixed effects) and the treatment result aside, the treated firms have a 2.8% higher return on 
assets. 
5.3.2 Operating Margin and EBITDA Margin 
I calculated the return on assets for all firms for all years using plant level data. The Norwegian 
Corporate Accounts calculated the operating margin (OM) and EBITDA margin (EM) and 
listed it in their database. I did the same 18 analyses on all three profitability measures. See 
appendix 9-11 for results on OM, and appendix 12-14 for the regressions on the EM. 
Unfortunately, very few of the analyses on either OM or EM were statistically significant. The 
only results that provide additional insight to the trends presented in the ROA-analysis, are 
that of Bodø and Kristiansund. They both had a negative ROA-effect of 5-6%. I find a negative 
effect on the OM of 11-12% (statistically significant to the 1st percentile for both), and a negate 
effect on the EM of 6-9% (significant for Bodø). These findings give weight to the fact that 
there is a negative effect of treatment on profitability in those two areas.  
I find positive effect on both OM and EM for routes opening in 2010. Only one route opened 
that year, Oslo-Brønnøysund. I find no statistically significant improvement of EM or OM for 
those areas in either of the area-analyses, showing that this effect is only apparent when 
comparing to the dataset as a whole, not on a regional level. 
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I run the regression model excluding the firm-specific effects on OM and EM as well. Both 
analyses give a positive result on a national level (see appendix 18). The operating margin has 
a statistically significant 4.0% treatment effect. Again this does not mean that the treatment 
had a 4% effect on OM, only that there is a 4% higher OM in the treated group after treatment, 
compared to the control group. This effect may come from inherent differences in the firms, 
but supports my hypothesis of improved profitability from closer proximity. 
5.3.3 Investment 
The investment analyses looks at the effect of treatment with regards to the amount of NOK a 
headquarter invests in a plant. Looking at the investment in subsidiaries in single-plant firms, 
I see how the level of investment changes with closer proximity and therefore increased 
monitoring. I find a strong effect of decreased investment in subsidiaries, on a national level. 
This effect is persistent at a regional level (the Bergen example), and within industry groups 
(see appendix 15-17). This effect is surprising, and not the same result at Giroud (2012) found. 
Overall, at a national level, the treatment effect of investment is on average NOK -31 140. 
When looking at year-specific analyses, the years containing seven of the ten treated routes 
are all significant and negative. At industry level, two of the three industries are significant 
and negative. Out of all the analyses, the industry of real estate/ services/ advisors has the 
highest negative treatment effect of NOK -169 873. At a regional level five of the ten areas 
are significant, with four showing a negative trend, and only Stavanger having a positive 
treatment effect. 
All these analyses put together show a strong negative treatment effect on investment. A 
possible explanation to this, is that the increased monitoring has led to either a loss of faith in 
the plant, or to the implementation of a better, cheaper strategy. Perhaps increased monitoring 
has led to a better control and overview of a plant’s investment needs, and therefore less but 
more strictly monitored investment. Uncovering inefficiencies in plants may lead headquarters 
to choose to have more in-house activities. Headquarter managers may have knowledge and 
expertise that uncover potential cost saving and better strategies for a plant. Monitoring and 
advice from these can therefore lead to less investment. 
It is important to remember the assumption that “investment in subsidiaries” listed in a 
headquarter’s financial statement, reaches a plant when it is the only plant in my dataset with 
that particular organization number as headquarter. If this assumption does not hold, there 
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might not be a connection between investment and a direct route between headquarter and 
plant. Due to the strong statistical evidence on several different grounds, I believe my 
assumption to be correct, and that proximity leads to less investment in subsidiaries in Norway. 
5.3.3.1 Profitability from Investment 
I calculate the profitability deriving from investment, of net income divided by the investment 
received from headquarter. An increase in this profitability measure would show that even 
though investment goes down with treatment, the investment is more optimally placed and 
utilized by treated firms. I run all 18 analyses on this profitability measure, and even though 
they show a positive trend, none are statistically significant to the 10th percentile. I can 
therefore not say whether treatment has an effect on the profitability deriving from investment 
from headquarter.  
Figure 5-5 – National Investment 
’ 
Overall Analysis Investment Productivity
Treatment Effect  -31 140*** 0.0767
(12 082.6) (0.1099)
Constant 76 755***  -0.0939
(11 000.0) (0.1000)
Number of Observations 1905 1904
Number of Groups 441 441
Avg. plant-year obs.  4.3  4.3
R2 within 0.0108 0.0127
R2 between 0.0001 0.0044
R2 overall 0.0003 0.0026
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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5.3.4 Lifespan of Plants 
I want to see if there are any statistical difference in the probability of bankruptcy or lifespan 
associated with treatment. I calculated the number of years a plant listed financial data, using 
this as a proxy of being “alive”. I divided the firms into two analyses based on two 
assumptions; the lifespan of the ones that were active at the beginning of my sample (2003) 
and then went bankrupt, and the lifespan of the firms that were still active in 2012. For the 
firms that went bankrupt during my time period, I find an average lifespan of 3.65 years (after 
2003) that is statistically significant to the 1st percentile. I find no statistical difference between 
the control and treatment groups. 
For the firms that were still active in 2012, I find an average lifespan of 5.36 years (after 2003) 
that is statistically significant to the 1st percentile. I find no statistical difference between the 
control and treatment groups. 
5.4 Placebo analysis 
To see whether the treatment effect found in a regression is representative of the results found, 
one can do a placebo analysis. One can for example see if the effect uncovered is persistent if 
looked for at a non-treated time. This placebo analysis should prove that the treatment effect 
is zero if analyzed at a time the treatment effect should not be affecting the group. Because I 
do several analyses to uncover significant results, I can not do a sensitivity analysis on my 
whole dataset and draw conclusions from it. On the ROA analysis the Bergen area had four 
routes opening at three different years; 2005, 2006 and two in 2008.  
I do a placebo analysis on the Bergen area to see if the 3.9% treatment effect I found on return 
on assets is unique to the treated years. I use two new dummy variables to create a false 
treatment effect. I change the “after treatment”-dummy to be 1 when an observation is two 
years prior to the actual opening of the route. Combining this with the “treatment”-dummy 
from my main regression gives me a “placebo-intereaction”-dummy that is 1 when an 
observation is in the treatment group, and in a year after two years before the actual treatment. 
Running my regression model, including firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and robust 
clustered standard errors, with this “placebo-interaction”-dummy, will give me a new DID-
estimator. If my previously found treatment effect is the actual effect of a treatment, the DID-
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estimator should be close to zero, signaling no difference in the treatment and control groups 
before and after “treatment”. I make four different sets of placebo dummy-variables, for 1-2 
years before the actual treatment and 1-2 years after. This gives me these DID-estimators: 
 
I find no significant treatment effect prior to when the four treated routes are opened. The two 
prior DID-estimators are 1-2% but not statistically significant. I find a significant positive 
treatment effect both the year the routes are opened, and the year after. This is to be expected, 
as travel habits need time to adjust and to take advantage of new available routes. A direct 
route constitutes a continues improvement in proximity for treated firms compared to control 
firms, not just in the year it was introduced. Two years after the treatment the effect is lessened 
and no longer statistically significant. 
This placebo analysis strengthens my findings, and that the treatment effect in ROA comes 
from the actual opening of the four direct routes.   
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5.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
One of the simplifications I do is to exclude industry-adjusted factors. I do not find any 
significant results or differences in the three major industries I analyze. Including industry-
adjusted factors could uncover the trends I was looking for, and would be interesting to 
research further. 
I use the reduction in travel time only to identify the treated and control areas. Including the 
actual travel time reduction in the model could give a more precise representation of increased 
profitability as a factor of reduced travelling time, and could be an interesting angle for further 
research. 
My treatment window is limited both by the company-data I have access to, and the flight 
information I have access to. If one could gain access to data further back in time, it would be 
interesting to look at the effects after the SAS-Braathens merger or the introduction of 
Norwegian.  
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6. Conclusions 
Throughout this paper I have analysed the headquarter-plant relationship in Norway on the 
basis of the following three research questions: 
1: What is the economic effect of proximity on plant-level performance and investment in 
Norway? 
Sub-questions: 
2a: Are changes in performance more prominent in certain industries or areas? 
2b: Does proximity lead to more, or better investments in plants? 
I have looked at financial and descriptive plant level data to find trends and effects of direct 
flight routes between headquarter and plant. Using a reduction in travel time from a direct 
route as a proxy for improved proximity between headquarter and plant, I look at the effect of 
cheaper and increased monitoring on plant level performance and investment. I look for the 
presence of rational or irrational home bias, and the effect of increased plant level-knowledge 
on investment from headquarter. 
Using a difference in difference analysis on a treated- and control group before and after 
treatment, I have attempted to answer my three research questions. 
6.1 The Economic Effect of Proximity on Plant-Level 
Performance and Investment in Norway 
Using the return on assets, operating margin and EBITDA-margin and over 50 analyses on 
different groupings of the firms, I find a strong positive economic effect from treatment. The 
statistically significant analysis with the highest number of firms and observations is that of 
Bergen, including four of the ten treated routes, showing an increase in ROA of 3.9%. With a 
placebo analysis I show that the treatment effect stems from the actual flight route openings. 
Even though I have limited sample of plants, I conclude that overall on the basis of these 
numerous analyses, there is a significant positive effect from increased proximity between 
headquarter and plant.  
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6.2 Are changes in performance more prominent in certain 
industries or areas? 
I look at ten different areas in Norway to find evidence of economic improvement in different 
regions. I find a significant positive result on ROA in the three areas Bergen, Skien and 
Tromsø. Five of the ten treated routes are included in one or more of these areas. I conclude 
that improved proximity and increased monitoring has had a positive effect on the plants in 
these regions. 
Two of the areas, Bodø and Kristiansund, have significantly lower profitability after treatment, 
both in ROA, operating margin and EBITDA-margin. I conclude that for these areas, 
monitoring can have led to either irrational home bias, or over-monitoring and suboptimal 
decision making. 
The three largest industries in my sample make up almost 80% of my dataset. I analyse the 
industry groups individually to uncover trends, but none of the regressions prove statistically 
significant. Therefore I can not conclude whether the changes in profitability from treatment 
differ in various industry groups. 
6.3 Does proximity lead to more, or better investments in 
plants? 
I find a significant negative effect on investment from treatment. To support this conclusion, 
I run the regression on all areas, industry groups and years the new flights open. Throughout 
these I find a strong and negative effect. This means that while plant profitability (ROA) 
increases, the NOK investment the plant receives lessens with treatment. This can be due to 
the development of better and cheaper strategies by management through better knowledge 
and expertise. It can also come from management uncovering sub-optimal utilization of funds, 
leading to more in-house activities. 
I analyze profitability depending on the direct investment received from headquarter, but none 
of these analyses prove statistically significant. 
Overall conclusion: Proximity leads to less direct plant-investment, and increased plant-
level profitability in Norway. 
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Appendix  
Appendix 1 - Treated Areas                  
Areacode City/Area Airport Airportcode Postal Code 
1 Moss Rygge RYG 1501-1803, 1805-1816, 1823-1859, 1870-1893 
2 Skien Geiteryggen SKE 
3665, 3600-3619, 3646-3648, 3670-3799, 3800-
3855,3883,3900-3999  
3 Stavanger Sola SVG 4001-4398, 4440-4443, 5501-5598 
4 Bergen Flesland BGO 5000-5499, 5600-5995 
5 Kristiansund Kvernberget KSU 6408, 6430-6433. 6440-6447, 6490-6599, 6628-6699 
6 Trondheim Værnes TRD 7003-7797, 2500-2555 
7 Oslo Gardermoen OSL 
0001-2391, 2401-2418, 2435-2438, 2601-2629, 2635-
2637, 2649-2657, 2711-2893, 2900-2937, 3001-3491, 
3500-3539, 3601-3628, 3646-3648, 3665, 3671-3853, 
3901-3999  
8 Brønnøysund Brønnøy BNN 7800-7994, 8680, 8681, 8800-8880, 8900-8985 
9 Bodø Bodø BOO 8001-8398 
10 Tromsø Langnes TOS 9000-9148, 9240-9306, 9370-9389 
Control Areas                   
Areacode City/Area Airport Airportcode Postal Code 
11 
Ålesund, 
Molde 
Vigra, Årø AES, MOL 
6000-6399, 6401-6407, 6409-6429, 6434-6436, 6450-
6488, 6600-6622 
12 Kristiansand Kjevik KRS 4400-4438, 4460-4745, 4760-49999 
13 Alta Alta ALF 9150-9197, 9500-9999 
14 
Harstad, 
Narvik 
Evenes EVE 8400-8599, 9400-9499, 9310-9365, 9201-9220 
15 
Florø, Førde, 
Sogndal 
Florø, 
Bringenes 
FRO, FDE, 
SOG 
6700-6999 
16 
Røros, 
Fagernes 
Røros, Leirin RRS, VDB 
2420-2432, 2440-2485, 2560-2584, 2630-2634, 2639-
2648, 2658-2695, 2939-2985, 2638, 2490 
17 No major None   
3540-3595, 3629-3632, 3650-3661, 3666, 3854-3895, 
4747-4756 
18 No major None   8600-8672, 8690-8799, 8842-8852, 8890-8899 
 59 
Appendix 2 – Treated Routes 
Treated Routes 
# Airport 1 Airport 2 Year treated Previous optimal route Time saved Firms on route 
1 Moss Bergen 2008 Oslo (car) 76 33 
2 Moss Stavanger 2008 Oslo (car) 70 49 
3 Moss Trondheim 2008 Oslo (car) 70 39 
4 Oslo Brønnøysund 2010 Trondheim 58 42 
5 Stavanger Trondheim 2006 Bergen 90 101 
6 Stavanger Kristiansund 2006 Bergen 80 22 
7 Stavanger Skien 2005 Sandefjord (car) 51 40 
8 Bergen Skien 2005 Sandefjord (car) 46 24 
9 Bergen Bodø 2008 Trondheim 70 12 
10 Bergen Tromsø 2007 Oslo 85 13 
 
  
Appendix 3 – Control Routes Between Treated Airports 
Control routes between treated 
airports 
# Airport 1 Airport 2 Firms on route 
1 Moss Brønnøysund 0 
2 Moss Kristiansund 21 
3 Stavanger All North 100 
4 Bergen Brønnøysund 12 
5 Skien Trondheim 37 
6 Skien Brønnøysund 0 
7 Skien Bodø 1 
8 Skien Tromsø 4 
9 Kristiansund Brønnøysund 9 
10 Kristiansund Bodø 2 
11 Kristiansund Tromsø 3 
12 Brønnøysund Bodø 13 
13 Brønnøysund Tromsø 6 
14 Skien Kristiansund 1 
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Appendix 4 - Control Routes Between Treated and Non-Treated Areas 
Control rotes from treated areas to non-treated areas 
# Airport 1 Airport 2 Firms on route 
15 Skien Only Ålesund 8 
16 Kristiansund Only Ålesund 27 
17 Moss Ålesund, Molde 17 
18 Brønnøysund Ålesund, Molde 10 
19 Bodø Ålesund, Molde 9 
20 Tromsø Ålesund, Molde 23 
21 Moss Kristiansand 33 
22 Trondheim kristiansand 51 
23 Brønnøysund Kristiansand 3 
24 Bodø Kristiansand 6 
25 Tromsø Kristiansand 6 
26 Moss Florø, Førde, Sogndal 8 
27 Skien Florø, Førde, Sogndal 4 
28 Stavanger Florø, Førde, Sogndal 21 
29 Kristiansund Florø, Førde, Sogndal 5 
30 Trondheim Florø, Førde, Sogndal 15 
31 Brønnøysund Florø, Førde, Sogndal 3 
32 Bodø Florø, Førde, Sogndal 4 
33 Tromsø Florø, Førde, Sogndal 12 
34 Moss Røros, Fagernes 6 
35 Skien Røros, Fagernes 3 
36 Kristiansund Røros, Fagernes 4 
37 Trondheim Røros, Fagernes 12 
38 Brønnøysund Røros, Fagernes 1 
39 Bodø Røros, Fagernes 0 
40 Tromsø Røros, Fagernes 0 
41 Moss Alta, Finmark 3 
42 Skien Alta, Finmark 1 
43 Bergen Alta, Finmark 29 
44 Kristiansund Alta, Finmark 6 
45 Trondheim Alta, Finmark 18 
46 Brønnøysund Alta, Finmark 4 
47 Moss Harstad, Narvik 10 
48 Skien Harstad, Narvik 2 
49 Bergen Harstad, Narvik 16 
50 Kristiansund Harstad, Narvik 1 
51 Brønnøysund Harstad, Narvik 9 
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Appendix 5 – SN02 Industry Codes 
Industry Groups (SN02) 
Code 
From 
To Number of firms 
Primary Indusries 0 10000 34 
Oil/Gas 11000 12000 7 
Manufacturing industries 10000 11000 145 
 12000 40000  
Construction/Energy 40000 50000 40 
Trade 50000 60000 261 
Transport/tourism 60000 65000 24 
Shipping 60300 60400 12 
 61100 61200  
Finance, Insurance 65000 70000 10 
Services/real estate/ advisors 70000 75000 251 
 90000 91000  
Health Care 85000 90000 39 
Culture, Media 92000 95000 15 
IT/Telecom 30020 31000 24 
 64200 65000  
 71330 71340  
  72000 73000   
 
Appendix 6 – Return on Assets in Different Areas 
 
 
 
 
Treatment Effect 0.0182 0.0752*  -0.0274 0.0387**  -0.0598**  -0.0073 0.0380  -0.0053  -0.0527*** 0.0949***
(0.0280) (0.0416) (0.0246) (0.0166) (0.0247) (0.1340) (0.4712) (0.0669) (0.0092) (0.0188)
Constant  -0.0039 0.1796  -0.0083  -0.0490**  -0.0538**  -0.0363**  -0.1331  -0.1147***  -0.1169***  -0.0546***
(0.0246) (0.0253) (0.0106) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0148) (0.0397) (0.0298) (0.0208) (0.0204)
Number of Observations 1231 786 1965 845 592 1594 222 678 349 475
Number of Groups 195 120 318 128 81 259 36 103 51 81
Avg. plant-year obs.  6.3  6.5  6.2  6.6  7.3  6.2  6.2  6.6  6.8  5.9 
R2 within 0.0223 0.0116 0.0092 0.0328 0.0446 0.0102 0.0860  0.0230 0.0237  0.0213 
R2 between 0.0086 0.0390 0.0007 0.0070 0.0297 0.0012 0.0165 0.0000 0.0011 0.0077
R2 overall 0.0171 0.0235 0.0001 0.0159 0.0055 0.0058 0.0449 0.0115 0.0017 0.0185
Oslo Brønnysund Bodø Tromsø
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
ROA Moss Skien Stavanger Bergen Kristiansund Trondheim
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Appendix 7 - Return on Assets in Different Years with Flight Openings 
 
Appendix 8 - Return on Assets in Different Industries 
ROA Manufacturing Trade 
Services/ Real Estate/ 
Advisors 
      
Treatment Effect  -0.0164  -0.0295 0.0382 
  (0.0193) (0.0203) (0.0334) 
      
Constant  -0.0117  -0.0211  -0.0285 
  (0.0177) (0.0143) (0.0295) 
        
      
Number of Observations 1069 1618 1454 
Number of Groups 145 261 251 
Avg. plant-year obs.  7.4  6.2  5.8 
      
R2 within 0.0170 0.0104 0.0051 
R2 between 0.0058 0.0010 0.0003 
R2 overall 0.0036 0.0052 0.0072 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01     
Treatment Effect 0.0177 0.0042 0.1052***  -0.0130 0.0106
(0.0146) (0.0188) (0.0103) (0.0185) (0.0356)
Constant  -0.0345***  -0.0373***  -0.0430***  -0.0380***  -0.0439***
(0.0125) (0.0104) (0.01430) (0.0130) (0.0140)
Number of Observations 3563 3944 3237 3960 3430
Number of Groups 558 617 507 627 536
Avg. plant-year obs.  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.3  6.4
R2 within 0.0057 0.0078 0.0098 0.0103 0.0077
R2 between 0.0042 0.0001 0.0007 0.0042 0.0000
R2 overall 0.0054 0.0039 0.0054 0.0062 0.0036
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
2010ROA 2005 2006 2007 2008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Appendix 9 - Operating Margin in Different Areas 
 
 
Appendix 10 - Operating Margin in Different Years with Flight Openings 
 
 
 
Treatment Effect  -0.0870  -0.0558  0.0014  -0.0730  0.1616**
(0.1617) (0.0505) (0.0912) (0.0459) (0.0714)
Constant  -0.1232**  -0.0925***  -0.1294  -0.1047  -0.1348***
(0.0327) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0233) (0.0305)
Number of Observations 3035 3356 2732 3379 2889
Number of Groups 505 554 453 562 479
Avg. plant-year obs.  6.0  6.1  6.0  6.0  6.0
R2 within 0.0038 0.0048 0.0051 0.0041 0.0058
R2 between 0.0104 0.0004 0.0070 0.0030 0.0020
R2 overall 0.0026 0.0002 0.0032 0.0014 0.0012
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
Operating Margin 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010
Treatment Effect  -0.0827  -0.0010  -0.0563  0.0118  -0.1160*** 0.0161 0.0276 0.1840  -0.1280***  0.1437
(0.0825) (0.1018) (0.0410) (0.1277) (0.0337) (0.0444) (0.4976) (0.1182) (0.1986) (0.1136)
Constant  -0.0127  -0.0038  -0.0004  -0.0705 0.0161 0.0235  -0.1453  -0.2749  -0.4324***  -0.1531**
(0.0216) (0.0800) (0.0370) (0.0745) (0.0094) (0.0242) (0.4457) (0.1663) (0.0633) (0.0510)
Number of Observations 1060 668 1720 734 520 1342 176 569 305 411
Number of Groups 171 108 299 118 73 222 31 93 47 74
Avg. plant-year obs.  6.2  6.2  5.8  6.2  7.1  6.0  5.7  6.1  6.5  5.6
R2 within 0.0039 0.0221 0.0093 0.0106 0.0442 0.0115 0.0317 0.0113 0.0383 0.0243
R2 between 0.0116 0.0150 0.0026 0.1707 0.0099 0.0030 0.0316 0.0005 0.0040 0.0329
R2 overall 0.0018 0.0148  0.0001 0.0194 0.0267 0.0090 0.0154 0.0005 0.0134 0.0213
Kristiansund Trondheim Oslo Brønnysund Bodø TromsøOperating Margin Moss Skien Stavanger Bergen
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix 11 - Operating Margin in Different Industries 
 
 
Appendix 12 - EBITDA Margin in Different Areas 
 
 
 
Treatment Effect 0.0081  -0.0027  -0.0433
(0.0468) (0.0513) (0.0855)
Constant  -0.0254  -0.0854 0.0314
(0.0408) (0.0345) (0.0692)
Number of Observations 957 1539 1117
Number of Groups 134 254 208
Avg. plant-year obs.  7.1  6.1  5.4
R2 within 0.0145 0.0033 0.0104
R2 between 0.0318 0.0031 0.0006
R2 overall 0.0108 0.0006 0.0037
Operating Margin Manufacturing Trade
Services/ Real Estate/ 
Advisors
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
Treatment Effect  -0.0793 0.0086  -0.0380 0.0460  -0.0686 0.0107 0.1322 0.2000  -0.0910** 0.1265
(0.0633) (0.0806) (0.0304) (0.0788) (0.0534) (0.0482) (0.4183) (0.1223) (0.0351) (0.1121)
Constant 0.04672 0.0597 0.0748* 0.0093 0.1536*** 0.0741**  -0.1018  -0.1393  -0.2770***  -0.0706
(0.0203) (0.0693) (0.0316) (0.0743) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.3645) (0.1459) (0.0563) (0.0484)
Number of Observations 1060 668 1720 734 520 1342 176 569 305 441
Number of Groups 171 108 299 118 73 222 31 93 47 74
Avg. plant-year obs.  6.2  6.2  6.8  6.2  7.1  6.0  5.7  6.1  6.5  5.6
R2 within 0.0046 0.0228 0.0091 0.0164 0.0406 0.0127 0.0416 0.0138 0.0311 0.0214
R2 between 0.0162 0.0090 0.0005 0.1344 0.0086 0.0022 0.0298 0.0006 0.0079 0.0448
R2 overall 0.0048 0.0133 0.0007 0.0287 0.0215 0.0089 0.0173 0.0005 0.0145 0.0203
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
Trondheim Oslo Brønnysund Bodø Tromsø
Robust standard errors in parentheses
EBITDA Margin Moss Skien Stavanger Bergen Kristiansund
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Appendix 13 - EBITDA Margin in Different Years with Flight Openings 
 
Appendix 14 – EBITDA Margin in Different Industries 
 
Treatment Effect  -0.0598  -0.0369  0.0084  -0.0598 0.1883 **
(0.1293) (0.0427) (0.0891) (0.0380) (0.0693)
Constant  -0.0250  0.0033  -0.0270  -0.0141  -0.0340
(0.0318) (0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0223) (0.0289)
Number of Observations 3035 3356 2732 3379 2889
Number of Groups 505 554 453 562 479
Avg. plant-year obs.  6.0  6.1  6.0  6.0  6.0
R2 within 0.0034 0.0043 0.0045 0.0042 0.0063
R2 between 0.0215 0.0004 0.0197 0.0123 0.0028
R2 overall 0.0041 0.0006 0.0033 0.0031 0.0012
2008 2010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
EBITDA Margin 2005 2006 2007
Treatment Effect 0.0355 0.00376  -0.0269
(0.0428) (0.0460) (0.0740)
Constant 0.0622  -0.0484 0.1679
(0.0398) (0.0314) (0.0658)
Number of Observations 957 1593 1117
Number of Groups 134 254 208
Avg. plant-year obs.  7.1  6.1  5.4
R2 within 0.0192 0.0035 0.0074
R2 between 0.0452 0.0051 0.0003
R2 overall 0.0166 0.0010 0.0027
EBITDA Margin Manufacturing Trade
Services/ Real Estate/ 
Advisors
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix 15 - Investment in Different Areas 
 
 
Appendix 16 - Investment in Different Years with Flight Openings 
Investment 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 
        
Treatment Effect -27 558  -51 058*  -74 600*  -51 667*** -34 405 
  (36 142.3) (26 182.2) (38 537.7) (17 307.2) (29 151.3) 
        
Constant 46 405*** 62 743*** 54 362*** 64 566*** 86 267*** 
  (15 005.7) (15 016.8) (16 221.2) (14 102.9) (16 009.2) 
            
        
Number of Observations 1207 1308 1110 1309 1171 
Number of Groups 280 305 253 303 268 
Avg. plant-year obs.  4.3  4.3  4.4  4.3  4.4 
        
R2 within 0.0838 0.0772 0.0880 0.0802 0.0786 
R2 between 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0001 
R2 overall 0.0062 0.0048 0.0064 0.0055 0.0018 
        
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01         
 
 
 
Treatment Effect  -58 473*** -38 884 32 165*  -120 136*** 78 841  -86 824*** 44 735 31 658 -10 406  -47 166**
(25 021.4) (37 070.9) (19 535.5) (32 397.5) (113 175.2) (27 041.85) (50 005.9) (29 008.2) (9 805.4) (23 598.1)
Constant 107 309*** 74 029*** 84 427*** 17 450 88 953 78 191*** 374 469*** 231 091*** -406 62 525***
(25 537.1) (23 514.2) (16 534.3) (33 430.3) (55 370.47) (20 858.9) (40 170.1) (28 395.2) (7 111.5) (16 388.8)
Number of Observations 369 264 615 351 159 562 111 225 146 213
Number of Groups 83 60 145 79 39 130 23 60 31 47
Avg. plant-year obs.  4.4  4.4  4.2  4.4  4.1  4.3  4.8  3.8  4.7  4.5
R2 within 0.1023 0.1260 0.0537 0.1082 0.1548 0.0977 0.1139 0.1249 0.1756 0.1106
R2 between 0.0032 0.0085 0.0016 0.0757 0.0002 0.0011 0.0226 0.0043 0.0201 0.0051
R2 overall 0.0189 0.0231 0.0056 0.0637 0.0063 0.0099 0.0008 0.0023 0.0041 0.0107
Bodø Tromsø
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
BergenInvestment Moss Skien Stavanger Kristiansund Trondheim Oslo Brønnysund
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Appendix 17 – Investment in Different Industries 
Investment Manufacturing Trade 
Services/ Real 
Estate/ Advisors 
      
Treatment Effect 18 454  -6 487***  -169 873*** 
  (12 443.22) (2 438.7) (39 674.8) 
      
Constant 95 823***  16 094***  349 148*** 
  (11 343.4) (3 026.0) (43 790.8) 
        
      
Number of Observations 457 491 514 
Number of Groups 93 120 128 
Avg. plant-year obs.  4.9  4.1  4.0  
      
R2 within 0.0665 0.1212 0.2126 
R2 between 0.0000 0.0027 0.0119 
R2 overall 0.0150 0.0044 0.0239 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01, p < 0.015     
 
Appendix 18 – Regressions without Firm Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 
Treatment Effect 0.0282*** 0.0406* 0.0164  -44 785** 0.0350
(0.0083) (0.02419 (0.0212) (19 606.1) (0.0718)
Constant  -0.0155  -0.0542  -0.0430*** 107 272*** 0.0533
(0.0119) (0.0343) (0.01430) (30 513.1) (0.1117)
Number of Observations 5530 4759 4759 1905 1904
R-sq 0.0057 0.0026 0.0025 0.0073 0.0043
Adj. R-sq 0.0042 0.0005 0.0004 0.0021  -0.0010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01
Investment
Investment 
Profitability
Without Firm Fixed Effects ROA OM EM
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Appendix 19 – Profitability in Different Industries 
Profitability Manufacturing Trade 
Services/ Real Estate/ 
Advisors 
      
Treatment Effect 0.1452 0.0691  -0.1444 
  (0.2086) (0.2135) (0.2752) 
      
Constant  -0.0722 0.0404  -0.1919 
  (0.1897) (0.1819) (0.2233) 
        
      
Number of Observations 456 491 514 
Number of Groups 93 120 128 
Avg. plant-year obs.  4.9  4.1  4.0 
      
R2 within 0.0196 0.0251 0.0189 
R2 between 0.0351 0.0057 0.0076 
R2 overall 0.0121 0.0143 0.0000 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*p < 0.10, ** p <0 .05, *** p < 0.01     
 
 
